Adding injury to insult: Intrusive laws on top of a weak system by Ntliziywana, Phindile
Adding Injury to Insult:




Local governments often encounter difficulties when state functions and powers 
are devolved to them.1 Capacity at local level often becomes the Achilles heel 
of devolution. This is the case in South Africa.2 The South African national 
government has undertaken a variety of capacity-building initiatives to address 
the capacity problems faced in the South African system of local government. 
A flurry of legal instruments containing capacity-building measures have been 
passed and more are in the offing. This paper is inspired by the argument raised 
by Steytler and De Visser about the national government’s attempt to legislate 
systemic problems faced by municipalities out of existence. I consider the 
overregulation relating, among others, to the professionalisation3 of, and capacity 
building at, local government. I argue that the practice of throwing a law at the 
problem erodes respect for the rule of law, a principle explicitly listed as one 
of the foundational values of our constitutional democracy,4 in that many rules 
make compliance impossible, leading to compliance fatigue and the resultant 
lawlessness. The multiplicity of laws also threatens to undermine municipalities’ 
constitutionally-entrenched independence and authority over their own affairs.
I begin in Part II by painting a general picture of the current state of local 
government in South Africa, in order to uncover the rationale for the national 
government’s interventions in local government. In Part III, I look at the initial 
short term interventions the national government attempted, which did not yield 
tangible outcomes. In Part IV I show how the overregulation that forms the 
crux of this paper has its basis in the Constitution and the statutes giving effect 
thereto. I set out specific instances of duplication, contradiction and overlapping 
by competing national departments vying for regulatory control of local 
government. I conclude the Part by considering the implications of overregulation 
* Lecturer, Department of Public Law, University of Cape Town.
1 BW Honadle ‘Theoretical and Practical Issues of Local Government Capacity in an Era of 
Devolution’ (2001) 31 Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy 77.
2 J Seddon & G de Tommaso ‘Civil Service Reform and Decentralization’ in J Litvack & J Seddon 
(eds) Decentralization Briefing Notes (1999) 39.
3 In this context, professionalisation relates to the insistence by the national government on 
qualifications and experiential requirements; adherence to the code of professional ethics; and the 
insulation of professional independence of senior managers from political meddling.
4 Constitution s 1. 
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for municipal autonomy and the rule of law. I end the article with a suggestion for 
a single set of regulations and improved coordination.
II background
It has been 22 years since the dawn of democracy in South Africa and 16 years 
into the implementation of a new and transformed local government system.5 
Indications are that this new system of local government is today in a critical 
phase.6 On the one hand, it has not only managed to absorb the pressures and 
pains of a wholesale transformation (which took place at breath-taking speed) but 
has also made great strides towards extending service delivery and development 
to marginalised communities.7 Local government has emerged from being 
an institution that was racially configured and only covering urban nodes8 –
resulting in deep structural disparities – to an institution with democratically 
elected leadership, constitutional status and a developmental philosophy.9 It now 
covers the entire landscape of the country and it is working tirelessly to rectify 
the ravages of apartheid.
On the other hand, as expectations of service delivery at local level have risen, it 
has become evident that the broader transformation of local government is either 
imperfect or incomplete.10 The de-racialisation and democratisation of the local 
government system were not on their own sufficient to achieve the developmental 
5 The period between 1995 and 1998 saw the amalgamation of racially-defined municipalities into 
integrated, wall-to-wall municipalities, in terms of the Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993. 
This is what Doreen Atkinson refers to as ‘first generation issues’. Between 1998 and 2000 the ‘second 
generation issues’ were raised as part of the 1998 Local Government White Paper process. These 
debates attempted to flesh out the meaning of the constitutional provisions on local government. 
During this phase, over-arching normative questions were addressed, culminating in the key concept of 
‘developmental local government’. This resulted in the enactment of the Local Government: Municipal 
Structures Act 117 of 1998 (Municipal Structures Act) and the Local Government: Municipal Systems 
Act 32 of 2000 (Municipal Systems Act). The second generation issues were further taken forward 
in 2000 when municipalities were re-demarcated and elections took place under the re-demarcated 
municipalities. Unlike the first generation phase, the second generation phase emphasised the overall 
vision and rationale of local government.
6 Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs State of Local Government in South 
Africa: Overview Report - National State of Local Government (2009), available at https://pmg.org.za/files/
docs/091017tas.pdf .
7 Y Carrim ‘Towards a Better Understanding of these Service Delivery Protests’ Presentation to 
the National Council of Provinces (23 April 2010), available at http://www.dta.gov.za/cgta/index.
php/speeches/former-deputy-minister-yunus-carrim/271-towards-better-understanding-of-service-
delivery-protests-ncop-budget-debate-vote.
8 V Johnson ‘Outsourcing Basic Municipal Services: Policy, Legislation and Contracts’ (2004) 
LLM dissertation, University of the Western Cape, available at http://etd.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/
handle/11394/1318 .
9 Green Paper on Local Government Government Gazette 18370, General Notice 1500 (17 October 
1997)(Defines the developmental philosophy of local government to entail three inter-related aspects, 
namely, (a) the powers and functions of local government should be exercised in a way that has a 
maximum impact on economic growth and social development of communities; (b) as the sphere 
of government closest to the ground, local government has to integrate or coordinate the activities 
of other agents – including other spheres of government – within a municipal area; and (c) local 
government has a unique role to play in terms of building and promoting democracy.)
10 D Powell ‘Imperfect Transition – Local Government Reform in South Africa 1994-2012’ in 
S Booysen (ed) Local Elections in South Africa: Parties, People, Politics (2012) 11, 12.
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aspirations of government, nor to meet the expectations for municipal services by 
communities.11 The consequence is a massive burden on a municipal system that 
had previously confined its activities to a narrow range of local services.12 This is 
all the more so given that between 1993 and 2000, the population of South Africa 
increased from 37 million to 44 million, while the number of municipalities 
decreased from over 1000 to 284.13 In 2006, the number of municipalities 
decreased further to 283, whilst the population increased to 48 million.14 Further 
changes were implemented in 2011, with yet another reduction of municipalities 
to 278, serving the increased population of 51 million.15 From 2016, there will be 
267 municipalities, while the population has increased to 54 million.16 This means 
that some of the new municipalities are geographically much larger than before, 
more particularly the district municipalities. The magnitude of this mismatch 
between the number of municipalities and the population they now have to serve 
was neatly illustrated in 2003 by Doreen Atkinson:
Xhariep District Municipality in the Southern Free State is the size of Hungary; the 
Northern Free State District municipality has the same diameter as Belgium; and the 
Namakwa District Municipality is almost as wide as Kansas.17
A comparison of South Africa’s current 54 million population with a country 
like Brazil, which has over 190 million inhabitants, indicates that the average 
population per municipality in South Africa is 172 thousand people, while 
Brazil has only 34 thousand people per municipality.18 The increase in the 
size of municipalities means that the beneficiaries of the range of services the 
municipalities now have to offer have also increased substantially, placing a further 
burden on municipalities. This is compounded by the high number of unfilled 
11 R Cameron The Democratisation of South African Local Government: A Tale of Three Cities (1999). 
12 G van der Westhuizen & B Dollery South African Local Government Efficiency Measurement (April, 
2009) Working Paper, Centre for Local Government, University of New England, available at https://
www.une.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/16149/04-2009.pdf.
13 Statistics South Africa Community Survey 2007 (2007) 12, available at http://www.statssa.gov.za/
publications/P0301/P0301.pdf.
14 Ibid.
15 Statistics South Africa Census 2011 (2012) 14, available at http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/
P03014/P030142011.pdf .
16 Statistics South Africa Mid-Year Population Estimates (2015) 7, available at http://www.statssa.gov.
za/publications/P0302/P03022014.pdf.
17 D Atkinson ‘Post-apartheid Local Government Reforms: A Small Town Perspective’ (2003) 
Occasional Paper, Centre for Development and Enterprise 2.
18 J de Visser ‘Demarcation and Establishment of Municipalities in South Africa and Brazil: 
Comparative Notes’ conference presentation at the Colloquium on National Minimum Criteria for 
the Creation, Merger and Dissolution of Municipalities (Brasilia, September 2011), available at http://
www.docfoc.com/demarcation-and-establishment-of-municipalities-in-south-africa-and-brazil. 
Brazil has 5564 municipalities.
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posts in some municipalities.19 The situation is further exacerbated by chronic 
shortages of revenue streams, particularly in rural municipalities.20 The shift in 
size and responsibility has not only required an increase in the services offered, 
but also added to the pressure on the existing resources as well as on service 
delivery apparatus. As a result, the incomplete or imperfect transformation of 
local government has led to failures to rectify the ravages of apartheid.21
Citizens are demanding the promises and benefits of democratisation and 
deracialisation.22 When these promises are not fulfilled, they become disenchanted 
and manifest their frustrations with delivery failures through social movement-
style protests.23 Poorer communities mostly use protest actions (often violent) 
to bring their grievances with municipalities to the attention of government.24 
Wealthier communities, meanwhile, tend to organise themselves into ratepayer 
associations. Given South Africa’s history, this divide is racial.25
Against the foregoing background, it becomes clear that the new system of 
local government is mired, in the main, in a morass of chaos, with a few pockets 
of excellence mostly in urban areas – the ‘top third’ discussed in the lead paper.26 
Notwithstanding the enhanced status of local government, the efficiency of 
municipalities in discharging their service delivery and developmental obligations 
leaves much to be desired. It is clear that the system is not working as smoothly 
as it was envisaged. This brought about the need for further steps to be taken 
ostensibly to perfect the imperfections of transformation or, put differently, 
to complete it. In what follows, I will look at the response of the national 
government since it became clear the attempt to transform local government 
19 See Municipal Demarcation Board State Municipal Capacity Assessment 2010/2011 National Trends 
in Municipal Capacity (2012) 38, available at http://led.co.za/sites/default/files/cabinet/orgname-
raw/document/2012/state_of_municipal_capacity_assessment_2010_11_national_trends_report.
pdf. (Showed that on a provincial level the vacancy rates were highest in provinces with large rural 
population, such as Limpopo (47.2%), Kwazulu-Natal (39.9%) and the Eastern Cape (36.9%). If we 
had a skills pool of suitably qualified individuals to fill these vacancies, the increase in size would 
translate into economies of scale in the sense that there would be a concomitant increase in human 
resource capacity covering a large area.)
20 RW Bahl & PJ Smoke (eds) Restructuring Local Government Finance in Developing Countries: Lessons from 
South Africa (2003) 8.
21 Some of these being the inequalities and poverty occasioned by the skewed patterns of 
development in the apartheid era.
22 A McLennan ‘Unmasking Delivery: Revealing the Politics’ (2007) 7(1) Progress in Development 
Studies 5.
23 Ibid at 14.
24 D Powell, M O’Donovan & J de Visser Civic Protest Barometer 2001-2014 (2015), available at 
http://mlgi.org.za/talking-good governance/20150219%20Civic%20Protest%20Barometer%20Published 
% 20%20DP.pdf .
25 D Powell, J de Visser, A May & P Ntliziywana The Withholding of Rates and Taxes in Five Municipalities: 
Report of the Community Law Centre for SALGA (2010), available at http://mlgi.org.za/publications/
publications-by-theme/local-government-in-south-africa/withholding-of-rates/Withholding%20
of%20rates%2015Nov010.pdf. 
26 See Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs Back to Basics: Serving our 
Communities Better! (2014), available at http://www.cogta.gov.za/sites/cogtapub/B2BDOCS/The%20
Back%20to%20Basics%20Approach%20Concept%20Document.pdf#search=back%20to%20basics 
.
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is either incomplete or imperfect.27 The next section reviews, firstly, the ad hoc 
initiatives undertaken by the national government to capacitate municipalities, 
consistent with its constitutional duty to support local government. Secondly, it 
considers the legislative interventions by the national government into the human 
resource practices of municipalities, which also forms part of the broader support 
effort by the upper spheres of government. The latter is the crux of this article.
III government’S InItIaL reSponSe
Pursuant to its constitutional duty to support local government, the national 
government responded to these persistent challenges by introducing various ad 
hoc initiatives aimed at perfecting the imperfect transition. These attempts were 
short-term deployment interventions aimed at providing targeted hands-on 
support and engagement programmes for weaker municipalities with significant 
capacity gaps. Their aim was to build the necessary capacity needed by local 
government to perform its mandate. 
In the first place, national government introduced Project Consolidate, 
through which a number of technical experts were deployed to assist selected 
municipalities to deal with their service delivery bottlenecks and institutional 
challenges.28 Second, the Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA) 
was introduced. It aimed to create short-term, but sustainable, interventions to 
the skills problems across all spheres of government. Municipalities were among 
the intended chief beneficiaries, as they suffered from a dire need of engineering, 
planning, artisan, technical and project management skills.29 
Third, the Siyenza Manje Project was launched in 2005, aimed at the 
deployment of experts or skilled consultants to municipalities to assist with 
the implementation of infrastructure projects, planning and financial capacity 
building.30 Fourth, government initiated the Municipal Finance Management 
Support Programme. It was aimed at enhancing key financial management 
capacity in selected municipalities.31 Fifth, the Local Government Leadership 
Academy and its Municipal Leadership Development Programme was launched 
with the aim to accelerate and improve service delivery to communities by 
enhancing the leadership competencies of elected and appointed officials through 
structured and tailored leadership skills programmes.32 Sixth, a Five Year Local 
Government Strategic Agenda was introduced in 2006, aimed at mainstreaming 
27 Powell (note 10 above) at 12.
28 E Pieterse & M Van Donk ‘Developmental Local Government: Squaring the Circle Between 
Policy Intent and Practice’ in Van Donk et al (eds) Consolidating Developmental Local government: Lessons 
from the South African Experience (2008) 53–54.
29 Department of Provincial and Local Government National Capacity Building Framework for Local 
Government: In support of the Five Year Local Government Strategic Agenda (2008-2011) (2009) 73, available at 
http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/policy/090701capacitybuildingframework.
pdf.
30 Ibid at 74.
31 Ibid at 72.
32 Ibid at 73.
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all the hands-on support to local government to improve municipal governance, 
performance and accountability.33
In addition to the above, government adopted the Local Government Turn-
around Strategy which replaced the Five Year Local Government Strategic Agenda. 
The main aim of the turn-around strategy was to counteract the root causes of 
the crises undermining local government.34 In the last place, government has 
recently adopted yet another ad hoc programme called the Back to Basics strategy 
aimed at turning around at least two thirds of the country’s municipalities over 
the next two years.35
Bar one, these ad hoc measures did not manage to produce lasting and tangible 
outcomes. The last strategy – Back to Basics – is ongoing and its efficacy has not 
yet been adjudged. The rest of these interventions had a very limited impact in 
building sustained capacity because they were introduced as ‘quick fix’ solutions 
only to fill gaps rather than building the actual capacity. The National Development 
Plan says, in this regard, that the ‘tendency to jump from one quick fix or policy 
fad to the next’ has had the effect of creating ‘instability in organisational 
structures and policy approaches that further strain limited capacity’.36 The NDP 
further states that the search for a quick fix has diverted attention from more 
fundamental priorities, namely, deficit in skills and professionalism that affects 
all elements of the public service.37 Instead of building sustained capacity for 
effective performance, the ad hoc initiatives have had perverse outcomes.
This led to the introduction of legislative interventions in human resource 
practices, which initially promised to provide a lasting solution by, among other 
things, professionalising municipal administration. However, I argue that due to 
overreach and a lack of coordination, these legislative measures now threaten to 
stifle local government and threaten the rule of law.
Iv overreguLatIon 
When it became clear that the capacity constraints confronting local government 
persisted despite the deployment of skilled experts through a variety of ad hoc 
administrative measures discussed above, national government responded 
by, among others, attempting to professionalise municipal administration 
through regulation. A suit of parallel and overlapping laws were promulgated 
by the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
(CoGTA), the National Treasury and, later, the Department of Public Service 
and Administration (DPSA), to address capacity problems and professionalise 
33 Ibid at 73.
34 Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs Local government turnaround 
strateg y: Working together, turning the tide in local government (2009), available at http://www.dta.gov.za/cgta/
index.php/2014-04-29-10-00-08/publications-2/771-lgtas-information-booklet-1/file. 
35 S Stone & K Magubane ‘Pravin Gordhan Pins Hopes on Back to Basics Strategy’ Business Day 
(19 September 2014).
36 National Planning Commission National Development Plan: Vision 2030 (2011) 364, available at 
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/devplan_2.pdf (NDP).
37 Ibid.
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municipal administrations.38 This set the scene for tripwires of ‘must do’ 
requirements. It is worth setting out the constitutional and statutory basis for the 
variety of the regulatory interventions by the three departments before delving 
deeper into those.
A The Legal Basis for Regulation of Local Government
1 Constitutional Basis
The constitutional basis for capacity building through regulation is s 155(7) 
of the Constitution, which provides that ‘[t]he national … and the provincial 
government have the legislative and executive authority to see to the effective 
performance by municipalities of their functions … by regulating the exercise by 
municipalities of their executive authority’.39 Regulation is a form of supervision 
by the ‘upper’ spheres of government that sets the necessary framework within 
which local government functions can responsibly be exercised.40 In the First 
Certification judgment, the Constitutional Court held the term ‘regulate’ to mean 
‘a broad managing or controlling rather than a direct authorisation function’.41 
In the more recent Habitat Council judgment, which is discussed by De Visser and 
Steytler, the Constitutional Court held that s 155(7) does not entail the usurpation 
of the power or the performance of the function itself, but permits national and 
provincial governments to determine norms and guidelines.42
Further, s 216(1) of the Constitution provides that national legislation must 
establish a national treasury and prescribe measures to ensure both transparency 
and expenditure control in each sphere of government, by introducing generally 
recognised accounting practice; uniform expenditure classifications; and uniform 
treasury norms and standards. Section 216(2), in turn, provides that the national 
treasury must enforce compliance with the measures established in terms of 
s 216(1).
It is clear that the Constitution envisages a number of measures to regulate 
issues related to human resource management. In what follows, I explain that the 
source of duplications and parallel measures stemming from various government 
departments is the Constitution itself. Section 155(7) envisages regulations/
guidelines setting parameters within which local government can operate, 
38 Local Government: Municipal Performance Regulations for Municipal Managers and Managers 
Directly Accountable to Municipal Managers, Government Gazette 29089, General Notice R805 (1 August 
2006)(Performance Regulations); Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act: Municipal 
Regulations on Minimum Competency, Government Gazette 29967, General Notice R493 of 2007 
(15 June 2007)(Competency Regulations); Local Government Systems Amendment Act, 2011; and 
Local Government: Regulations on Appointment and Conditions of Employment of Senior Managers, 
Government Gazette 36223, Government Notice 167 (7 March 2013)(Appointment Regulations).
39 Emphasis added.
40 P Ntliziywana ‘Insulating Administrative Decision-Making Relating to Individual Staff 
Appointments from Political Meddling: Manana v King Sabata Dalindyebo Municipality’ (2012) 129 South 
African Law Journal 49.
41 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 [1996] ZACC 26, 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at para 377.
42 Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape v The Habitat 
Council and Others [2014] ZACC 9, 2014 (4) SA 437 (CC)(‘Habitat Council ’) at para 22.
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whereas s 216 envisages mandatory rules. The following discussion focuses on the 
national legislation giving effect to the constitutional provisions just discussed. 
2 Statutory Basis
The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act43 and the Local Government: 
Municipal Finance Management Act44 are the primary pieces of legislation that 
give effect to the provisions of s 155(7) of the Constitution.45 They are aimed 
at seeing to the effective performance by municipalities of their functions by 
regulating their human resource management, among other matters. They also 
envisage the promulgation of regulations to give further effect to the regulation 
of recruitment practices, ethics and discipline.46
The Municipal Systems Act contains provisions for human resource management 
which set forth basic values and principles governing local public administration. 
It provides that the administration of a municipality must be responsive to the 
needs of the residents and facilitate a culture of public service and accountability 
among staff.47 In fact, municipalities have the duty to provide an accountable 
government without fear or prejudice.48 They must also prevent corruption,49 and 
ensure an equitable, fair, open and non-discriminatory working environment.50 
The roles and responsibilities of managers and other staff members must also 
be aligned with the priorities and objectives of the municipality’s integrated 
development plan.51 The resources must be used in the best interest of the local 
community and municipal services must be provided to the local community in 
a financially sustainable way.52
In giving effect to the injunction to regulate human resource practices, s 72 
read with s 120 of the Municipal Systems Act enjoins the national minister 
responsible for local government (ie Minister of CoGTA) to make regulations 
dealing with capacity building within municipal administration.53 The regulations 
envisaged by ss 72 and 120 of the Municipal Systems Act were issued in 2006 as 
the Performance Regulations.54
In addition to giving effect to s 155(7) of the Constitution, the MFMA is 
also the national legislation envisaged in s 216. It prescribes measures to ensure 
transparency in local government by introducing generally recognised accounting 
practices; uniform expenditure classifications; and uniform treasury norms 
43 Act 32 of 2000 (Systems Act).
44 Act 56 of 2003 (MFMA).
45 However, these are not the only laws emanating from national government regulating local 
government. There is also the Municipal Structures Act and the Local Government: Municipal 
Property Rates Act 6 of 2004 (Municipal Property Rates Act).
46 Systems Act s 120 read with s 72 and MFMA s 168.
47 Systems Act ss 6(2)(a) and (b) read with ss 51(a) and (b).
48 Systems Act ss 4(2)(b), 6(2)(b) and 51(b). 
49 Systems Act ss 6(2)(c) and 51(c).
50 Systems Act s 51(m).
51 Systems Act s 51(d).
52 Systems Act ss 4(2)(a) and (d).
53 Systems Act s 72(1)(d).
54 Performance Regulations (note 38 above).
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and standards. As envisaged by the Constitution, the Act enjoins the National 
Treasury to enforce compliance with the measures listed above. 
As such, it also provides a statutory basis for the regulation of local government 
recruitment practices in South Africa. It requires officials to meet prescribed 
competency levels in financial and supply chain management.55 Section 168 of 
the MFMA also requires the National Treasury to make regulations or issue 
guidelines that prescribe financial management competency levels for the 
municipal administration. The regulations in terms of s 168 of the MFMA have 
been promulgated as the Competency Regulations.56 Up next is a discussion of 
regulations envisaged by ss 72 and 120 of the Municipal Systems Act and by s 168 
of the MFMA, which, as will be seen, are a source of overregulation in practice.
B Overregulation in practice
Overregulation began with the promulgation of the suite of laws that were meant 
to give effect to ss 155(7) and 216(1) of the Constitution, particularly with the aim 
of regulating human resource practices at local level. Leading the pack were the 
Municipal Systems Act and the MFMA. On the face of it, these laws are hardly 
over burdensome; they contain only 120 sections and 30 items in schedules, and 
180 sections, respectively. However, a closer look reveals that they each contain 
a thousand individual provisions, with many ‘musts’ that oblige municipalities 
or municipal officials to behave in a prescribed manner in an area that could 
arguably have been left to their discretion.57 This count, which, taken alone, 
would constitute trip wires, excludes the various regulations issued in terms of 
these Acts. Those additional regulations are the crux of the present discussion to 
which I now turn.
1 Performance Regulations
Empowered by the Municipal Systems Act, the then Department of Provincial 
and Local Government (now CoGTA) in 2006 responded to the persistent 
challenges facing local government by introducing the Performance Regulations. 
Their goal was to monitor local government and, ultimately, improve outcomes 
and performance.58 The Performance Regulations subject the employment 
of a municipal manager and those managers reporting directly to him or her 
to the signing of an employment contract and performance agreement,59 with 
the aim of measuring and evaluating their performance.60 These regulations 
employ a carrot and stick approach to ensuring satisfactory performance. In the 
case of outstanding performance, the officials concerned are rewarded with a 
performance bonus for a job well done.61 However, when performance is below 
55 MFMA ss 83, 107 and 119.
56 Competency Regulations (note 38 above).
57 N Steytler ‘The Strangulation of Local Government (2008) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 518.
58 The Preamble provides that these regulations seek to set out how the performance of municipal 
managers will be uniformly directed, monitored and improved.
59 Performance Regulations reg 4.
60 Performance Regulations reg 27.
61 Performance Regulations reg 32(2). 
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par, the regulations deploy corrective measures to ensure that substandard 
performance does not recur.62
Although the Performance Regulations’ main focus is on performance or 
results, they cursorily regulate recruitment of personnel – ostensibly to ensure that 
there is no mismatch between performance expectations and the skills employees 
actually possess.63 The regulations make it an inherent requirement of the job 
that municipal managers (and managers directly accountable to them) must have 
a recognised bachelor degree in a relevant field, five years relevant experience and 
core managerial and occupational competencies.64
2 Competency Regulations
Unfortunately, the National Treasury – empowered by the MFMA – saw a gap 
to introduce its own set of regulations to regulate human resource practices 
of municipalities. The introduction of these new regulations, the Competency 
Regulations, was the start of overregulation.
The Competency Regulations were issued in 2007, barely a year after the 
promulgation of the Performance Regulations. They provide for general 
and minimum competency levels for financial and supply chain management 
officials. The focus of these regulations is on the competence of municipalities’ 
staff. The National Treasury has also issued a number of guidelines to give flesh 
to the competency framework contained in the Competency Regulations. The 
guidelines apply to financial and supply chain management officials at senior and 
middle management levels. The competency framework consists of minimum 
qualifications, work related experience, core managerial competencies and core 
occupational competencies for financial officials both at senior and middle 
management levels.65 As a result, there were two sets of laws regulating human 
resource practices at local government. In certain instances, it became unclear 
which competency framework applied. For example, the Performance Regulations 
required a bachelor degree across the board, while the Competency Regulations 
differentiated municipalities according to their budget size, requiring higher 
qualifications for larger municipalities, and lower qualifications for smaller ones.
3 Municipal Systems Amendment Act
Not to be outdone by the National Treasury, in 2011 CoGTA convinced 
Parliament to amend certain provisions of the Municipal Systems Act dealing 
with the recruitment of staff in the upper echelons of municipal administration. 
The Local Government: Municipal Systems Amendment Act66 came into force 
on 5 July 2011. The provisions were amended to provide for new procedures 
and competency criteria for appointments, and for the consequences of non-
compliant appointments. For example, the amended Act provides that, to be 
62 Performance Regulations reg 32(3).
63 The competency framework is contained only in reg 38.
64 Ibid.
65 Competency Regulations regs 3, 5, 7, 9, 11 and 12.
66 Act 7 of 2011.
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appointed as a municipal manager (or a manager directly accountable to the 
municipal manager),67 a person must have specific qualifications and experience 
which would be set out in regulations or guidelines.68 
This set the scene for CoGTA to unleash more laws on municipalities. It 
issued the Local Government: Regulations on Appointment and Conditions of 
Employment of Senior Managers69 in 2014. This (third) set of regulations replaced 
a large portion (but not all) of the Performance Regulations. This added a further 
layer of compliance to local government administration.
The amended Municipal Systems Act provides that appointments made 
contrary to the competency framework – that is, the Appointment Regulations – 
are null and void.70 If a person is appointed contrary to that framework, the MEC 
must enforce compliance, including applying to court to declare the appointment 
invalid.71 If the MEC fails to enforce compliance with the competency framework, 
the Minister of CoGTA may step in.72
As opposed to the competency frameworks contained in the Performance 
Regulations and Competency Regulations, the amendments to the Municipal 
Systems Act introduced external enforcement. This means that in the three 
sets of regulations regulating human resource practices at local government, 
municipalities might decide to choose the less stringent framework. The mere 
existence of three different sets of regulations leaves the room open for cherry-
picking. Three municipalities might choose three different laws to regulate the 
same issues.
4 Appointment Regulations
The Appointment Regulations contain detailed and prescriptive competence 
requirements for the appointment of senior managers.73 The competence 
requirements are so detailed that they straddle two annexures. Senior managers 
must have a bachelor’s degree in a relevant field (mostly social sciences, public 
administration or law), five years’ experience, advanced knowledge74 and the 
competencies set out in Annexure A of the Appointment Regulations.
The Appointment Regulations clearly lower the bar in comparison to the 
National Treasury’s Competency Regulations. For example, the National 
Treasury uses a differentiated approach relative to a municipality’s budget size, 
with high capacity municipalities having higher qualifications and experience 
requirements while low capacity municipalities have lower standard requirements. 
The requirements in the Appointment Regulations (as in the Performance 
Regulations) are the same across the board – at the low capacity municipality 
standard – regardless of whether the appointment is made in a high capacity or a 
67 So-called ‘section 56 managers’.
68 Municipal Systems Act s 54A.
69 Government Gazette 37245, Government Notice 21 (17 January 2014)(Appointment Regulations).
70 Municipal Systems Act s 54A(3).
71 Municipal Systems Act s 54A(8).
72 Municipal Systems Act s 54A(9).
73 Appointment Regulations regs 8 and 9. 
74 Appointment Regulations Annexure B.
42 
low capacity municipality. The only exception is the Chief Financial Officer, whose 
requirements are the same as those contained in the Competency Regulations.
This presents the real possibility of municipalities cherry-picking the regulations 
that suit their circumstances at any given time. The lack of uniformity in the 
application of rules is not conducive to legal certainty. Furthermore, the detailed 
competence requirements contained in the Appointment Regulations might fail 
the constitutional test, as will be seen on the discussion of municipal autonomy 
hereunder, for violating its various provisions relating to municipalities’ ability 
or right to exercise their powers and conduct their internal affairs without any 
impediments.75
5 Public Administration Management Act (PAMA)76
PAMA was passed into law at the instance of the DPSA, and signed into law on 
22 December 2014. PAMA regulates employment in the public administration, 
specifically looking at transfers and secondments of employees between national, 
provincial and local spheres.77 This places DPSA squarely within the triangle of the 
departments warring for regulatory control of local government78 – secondments 
are also dealt with in the Municipal Systems Act79 and the Appointment 
Regulations.80 DPSA collides head-on with CoGTA – there are two regulatory 
regimes from two national departments on the same subject matter.
C Implications of overregulation for the rule of law
Broadly speaking, the rule of law denotes a system in which the laws are public 
knowledge, clear in meaning, and applied equally to everyone.81 In President of the 
Republic of South Africa v Hugo the Constitutional Court stated that the rule of law 
requires laws to be accessible, clear and general.82 In New National Party the same 
Court found that the rule of law ‘prevents Parliament from acting arbitrarily or 
capriciously when making law’.83 It can be summed thus: the rule of law requires 
laws to be publicly available, general in their application, clear, prospective and 
relatively stable.84
75 Constitution ss 151 and 160.
76 Act 11 of 2014.
77 PAMA ss 5 and 6.
78 PAMA s 3.
79 Municipal Systems Act s 54A(6).
80 Appointment Regulations reg 20.
81 T Carothers ‘The Rule of Law Revival’ (1998) 77(2) Foreign Affairs 95.
82 President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo [1997] ZACC 4, 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC), 1997 (6) BCLR 
708 (CC) at para 102.
83 New National Party v Government of the Republic of South Africa [1999] ZACC 5, 1999 (3) SA 191 (CC), 
1999 (5) BCLR 489 (CC) at para 19 (emphasis added).
84 J Raz ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (1977) Law Quarterly Review 93, 198ff; BZ Tamanaha On the 
Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (2004) 93; P Craig ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule 
of Law: An Analytical Framework (1997) Public Law 467, 469; LL Fuller The Morality of Law (1977) 41.
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The rule of law rests on two legs: legality and rationality.85 The principle of 
legality requires the exercise of power to be within the framework of the law. 
The exercise of public power is only legitimate where lawful. Public officials may 
exercise no power or perform no function beyond that conferred upon them by 
law.86 Otherwise, the exercise of such power is ultra vires and the official exercising 
it is in breach of the rule of law.87 An important development of the principle of 
legality is contained in the Constitutional Court’s SARFU judgment, where the 
Court said, ‘the exercise of the powers is also clearly constrained by the principle 
of legality and, as is implicit in the Constitution, the President must act in good 
faith and must not misconstrue [his or her] powers’.88 This applies equally to any other 
public functionary. This development is important in our context of a plethora 
of contradictory laws regulating the same subject matter. I argue below that – in 
light of the complicated and contradictory regulations – a municipality is likely 
to misconstrue not only its powers, but also the purpose for which those powers 
were given.
The principle of rationality was developed by the Constitutional Court in 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers.89 In a unanimous judgment, Chaskalson P (as he then 
was) explained rationality as follows:
It is a requirement of the rule of law that the exercise of public power by the Executive 
and other functionaries should not be arbitrary. Decisions must be rationally related to 
the purpose for which the power was given, otherwise they are in effect arbitrary and 
inconsistent with this requirement. It follows that in order to pass constitutional scrutiny 
the exercise of public power by the Executive and other functionaries must, at least, 
comply with this requirement. If it does not, it falls short of the standards demanded by 
our Constitution for such action.90
As argued by De Visser and Steytler, the many prescriptive and contradictory 
requirements contained in the legal framework set out above constitute what 
Geoff Budlender refers to as ‘trip wires’91 over which a municipality is bound 
to fall. Municipalities are caught between, on the one hand, delivering services 
to an already impatient public and, on the other, deciding which laws to apply, 
85 R Krüger ‘The South African Constitutional Court and the Rule of Law: The Masethla Judgment, 
A Cause for Concern? (2010) 13(3) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 468, 475ff. See Masethla v President 
of the Republic of South Africa [2007] ZACC 20, 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC), 2008 (1) BCLR 1 (CC)(Court was 
split on whether procedural fairness also constitutes a requirement of the rule of law. Moseneke DCJ, 
writing for the majority, excluded procedural fairness from the scope and the requirements of the rule 
of law, while Ngcobo J (as he then was) made it the requirement of the rule of law. In this article, I stick 
to the two uncontroversial requirements.)
86 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others 
[1998] ZACC 17, 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC), 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC) at para 59.
87 J Jowell ‘The Rule of Law Today’ in J Jowell & D Oliver (eds) The Changing Constitution (2000) 20.
88 President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others [1999] 
ZACC 11, 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC), 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC) at para 148 (emphasis added and footnotes 
omitted).
89 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others [2000] ZACC 1, 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC), 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC).
90 Ibid at para 85.
91 G Budlender ‘Talk at launch of Local Government Law of South Africa’ (Cape Town, 29 May 2008) 
(on file with the authors).
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deciphering their meaning and then ticking boxes as a way of complying with 
a flurry of ever growing legal requirements. This position potentially makes 
municipalities misconstrue the laws or act arbitrarily or capriciously. This could 
have a negative impact on the rule of law’s legality and rationality requirements. 
Compliance with the legal rules can become more important than achieving the 
object of the rules.92 When that happens, there is no longer a rational relationship 
between the purpose for which the law was passed and its application.
An example of this preference of form over substance is the court challenge 
to the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality’s decision to appoint Mrs 
Msengana-Ndlela as the municipal manager. Msengana-Ndlela was the former 
Director-General of CoGTA and was eminently suitable to run an administration 
of a large municipality.93 Despite her qualifications, years of experience and 
proven capability, the United Democratic Movement challenged her appointment 
for non-compliance with the Competency Regulations.94 The one qualification 
Msengana-Ndlela lacked was that she had not completed the Municipal Finance 
Management Programme required by the Competency Regulations. The 
regulations were (ab)used in an attempt to exclude a high calibre individual from 
the pool of eligible candidates in a manner that defeats the larger objective that the 
regulations sought to achieve – to professionalise local government by recruiting 
qualified, experienced and competent personnel.
It could be said that the office-bearers who challenged her appointment 
misconstrued the purpose for which the law was passed and applied the law 
arbitrarily or capriciously to exclude precisely the kind of personnel required to 
achieve excellence.95 They lost the plot by privileging form over substance. This 
conduct undermines both the principle of legality (which requires the executive 
authorities not to misconstrue their powers) and the principle of rationality (which 
demands a rational connection between the exercise of power and the objectives 
for which the power was given). Achieving the objective of the rules became of 
secondary importance.96 These are the consequences of having so many rules 
that they cloud the purposes for which the rules were passed in the first place.
The purpose of a particular law could also be misconstrued due to 
preoccupation with compliance with a flurry of legal requirements. While on its 
92 Steytler (note 57 above).
93 See P Ntliziywana & J de Visser ‘The Unexpected Pitfalls of Professionalising Local Government: 
Former Local Government Director-General “not qualified” to be City Manager?’ Politicsweb (28 June 
2013), available at http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/the-unexpected-pitfalls-of-
professionalising-local. Mrs Msengana-Ndlela was the Director-General of CoGTA (the national 
department responsible for overseeing the entire local government system in South Africa) for seven 
years. She was employed as a senior civil servant in various provincial and national government 
departments before that. She holds several degrees, including a Bachelor of Commerce, a Bachelor 
of Education, a Master’s degree in Business Leadership and a PhD in Urban Governance, Leadership 
and Local Economic Development. During her tenure in CoGTA, the department’s budget grew from 
R6 billion to over R24 billion and she achieved seven successive clean audits while managing these 
funds. She also oversaw a range of major policy and legislative initiatives, including the passing of the 
Municipal Property Rates Act and the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005. Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Steytler (note 57 above) at 529.
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face, compliance constitutes respect for the rule of law, it can lead to compliance 
fatigue so that municipalities attempting to comply with every requirement act 
arbitrary or capriciously – the focus becomes compliance, not professionalism or 
service delivery. This, arguably, violates the rationality principle.
Furthermore, local government legislation is becoming so excessively complex 
and confusing for non-specialist administrators that it threatens to undermine 
the basic requirement that laws must be ascertainable and accessible. Complying 
with a complex and elaborate legal framework carries a considerable price tag that 
many municipalities cannot afford.97 For the more capable municipalities it is a 
bearable burden; for the less-fortunate ones, it becomes an obstacle in the way 
of governance.98 Even those municipalities who can afford to comply are forced 
to expend resources to establish an in-house legal service, or to call on external 
experts to help them navigate their way through the maze of regulations. Those 
that cannot afford consultants are left to their own devices to misconstrue their 
powers. The worst possible consequence of overregulation is when municipalities 
opt out of lawful governance because compliance is too difficult or costly.99 In 
this instance, the weight of the legal obligations have a profoundly disempowering 
effect on smaller, low resourced municipalities.100 In that way, overregulation can 
directly result in the violation of the rule of law. Yet, ironically, non-compliance 
with over-burdensome regulation can be the rational choice.
The Competency Regulations are particularly amenable to this problem 
because they are extremely complex. The wording of these regulations present an 
interpretation headache and there are as many interpretations as there are lawyers. 
The Msengana-Ndlela debacle, discussed earlier, presents a perfect example of the 
intricacy of the regulation. For the post of a municipal manager, the regulations 
require, first, at least a bachelor’s degree and a higher diploma in a relevant 
field. Alternatively, the candidate can get a certificate in municipal financial 
management by completing the Municipal Finance Management Programme. 
Second, the regulations require five years’ experience at senior management level. 
Third, the regulations require compliance with the management competencies 
contained in the Performance Regulations.101 And fourth, the candidate must 
demonstrate ‘competence in the unit standards related to financial and supply 
chain management, which can be obtained by completing the Municipal Finance 
Management Programme’ – the same programme referred to in the first 
requirement. The first three requirements are straight forward and Msengana-
Ndlela easily complied with them. However, the last requirement presents 
interpretation difficulties.
97 Ibid at 527.
98 Ibid at 521.
99 Ibid at 530.
100 Ibid at 528. 
101 Competency Regulations reg 3.
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The difficulty is that it is both an alternative as well as an addition to the higher 
education qualifications requirement. With regard to the former, if an official 
does not have a bachelor’s degree required by the first requirement, he or she can 
enrol for the certificate in municipal financial management as an alternative to 
it.102 However, with regard to the latter, if an official already possesses a bachelor’s 
degree, he or she must still meet the fourth requirement, which essentially is the 
certificate in municipal financial management. The proviso with regard to the 
latter is that if an official already possesses higher educational qualification, he 
or she must be assessed by accredited training providers to establish the extent 
to which his or her higher education qualifications and experience offset the 
21 unit standards required for the certificate in municipal financial management. 
It is possible therefore that the assessment of Msengana-Ndlela, with all her 
qualifications and experience, would reveal that she must still meet one or two 
of the 21 unit standards or that her qualifications and experience counterbalance 
the fourth requirement.
This is where a number of municipalities and lawyers, get it wrong.103 The 
regulations do not meet the rule of law requirement that the law must be clear and 
must serve a rational purpose. The correct interpretation is that no matter how 
many degrees an official may have accumulated or how many years of experience 
he or she has, the certificate in financial management remains compulsory, unless 
the assessment of his or her qualifications and experience reveal otherwise. This 
is how a former Director-General with a PhD was deemed unsuitable to serve as 
a municipal manager, a position requiring only a bachelor degree.
The second difficulty with the Competency Regulations relates to the actual 
legal consequences of non-compliance. The appointment date is critical to 
determine the consequences of non-compliance. There are three categories. First, 
those officials who were appointed before the Competency Regulations came 
into effect on 1 July 2007 are safe, as long as they comply with the competency 
requirements before 30 September 2015.104
The second category is officials who were appointed after 1 July 2007, but 
before 30 September 2015. Their employment contract should stipulate that they 
must attain the competencies before 30 September 2015.105 If they do not meet 
the deadline, they will supposedly be in breach of their employment contracts. 
However, the Competency Regulations are not clear on what happens if an 
official does not meet the deadline.106 They are not automatically dismissed on 
30 September 2015 – our labour laws do not allow for that. So, the municipality 
would have to do something, but what? Must the official be dismissed? Or perhaps 
demoted? The National Treasury has not explained to municipalities what to 
102 Competency Regulations reg 3.
103 The South African Local Government Association (SALGA) and the City of Cape Town have 
commissioned legal opinions on the interpretation of these requirements.
104 Competency Regulations reg 15 provides that their continued employment would not be 
affected, provided that they attain the prescribed requirements before the end of the grace period.
105 Competency Regulations reg 15.
106 Competency Regulations reg 18(1) simply says that no municipality may employ, after the 
deadline, a person as a financial or supply chain manager if that person does not meet the competency 
levels prescribed for the relevant position.
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do, except to say that there will not be further extensions and that the process 
followed by municipal councils, as employers, to enforce these requirements must 
be consistent with the relevant laws.107 Again, this legal uncertainty violates the 
rule of law requirement that a law must be clear in its meaning.
The last category is those officials appointed after 30 September 2015. For 
those, the consequences of non-compliance are clearer. After the end of the 
grace period, any appointment in violation of the Competency Regulations will 
be unlawful and can be challenged in court.108
Another key issue emanating from the Competency Regulations that is 
threatening the rule of law relates to the continuous shifting of deadlines. The 
Competency Regulations suspended the immediate application of the competency 
framework to allow the officials who were already employed by municipalities 
when the Regulations were issued to acquire the prescribed minimum competency 
levels.109 These officials were initially given a five-year period of grace within 
which to acquire all the prescribed competency levels.110 The deadline for the 
attainment of the relevant competency levels was 1 January 2013 and has been 
extended twice to 30 September 2015.111 After this deadline, the employment 
of new financial and supply chain management officials who do not meet the 
minimum competency levels is strictly prohibited.112
The practice of putting a target in a law and then softening it a number of 
times as the deadline approaches threatens the rule of law. It is not conducive for 
legal certainty. Municipal officials are likely not to take the regulations seriously 
when they eventually become effective. This will have grave consequences for 
the principle of legality as it undermines the efficacy of the law. Now that the law 
has become effective, municipalities are carrying on with their business as usual. 
They are unlikely to treat the law with the seriousness it requires.
In what follows, I look at the impact of overregulation on municipal autonomy.
D Implications of overregulation for municipal autonomy
As noted earlier, the practice of throwing laws at a problem can also potentially 
fail the constitutional test for violating its various provisions relating to the 
municipalities’ ability or right to exercise their powers and regulate their internal 
affairs without any impediments. The relevant provisions that are threatened by 
this practice are ss 151(4) and 160 of the Constitution. These provisions confer 
107 National Treasury mentioned the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, the Municipal Systems 
Act (as amended), the Performance Regulations, the MFMA, the Competency Regulations and the 
MFMA Exemption Notice of March 2014 in a joint media statement issued on 30 September with 
CoGTA, available at http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2015/2015093001%20-%20
MinimumCompetencyStatement.pdf.
108 Competency Regulations reg 18.
109 Competency Regulations reg 15.
110 Ibid.
111 Firstly, in 2012 by MFMA Circular 60 of 20 April 2012 (on file with the author). Later 
by the Exemption Notice issued on 14 March 2014, available at http://mfma.treasury.gov.za/
RegulationsandGazettes/Documents/Gazette%20No.37432,14%20March%202014.pdf . 
112 Competency Regulations reg 18.
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autonomy on the municipal council over internal affairs of the municipality113 
and proscribe national and provincial governments from ‘comprom[ising] and 
imped[ing] a municipality’s ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its 
functions’.114
I argue that the flurry of laws issued by the national government, with their 
mandatory and prescriptive requirements, are actually impeding or compromising 
the municipalities’ ability or right to exercise their powers and perform their 
functions. Instead of expending their energy on delivering the much needed 
services and in discharging their developmental mandate, municipalities find 
themselves having to tick boxes and comply with hundreds if not thousands of 
‘musts’ scattered throughout local government legislation. This state of affairs has 
the potential to erode the autonomy of local government and relegate the local 
sphere to an implementing agent of other spheres. 
In its haste and overzealousness to fix local government, the national government 
inadvertently created a snare that traps local government instead of creating an 
enabling environment for local government to discharge its responsibilities. 
The five sets of secondary legislation115 from three different departments 
regulating the human resource practices with respect to senior managers in local 
government all contain peremptory norms that do not allow for local discretion. 
Following the Court’s finding in Habitat Council,116 the combined effect of these 
laws is a violation of s 151(4) of the Constitution. These laws encroach on the 
institutional integrity of local government and compromise the municipalities’ 
ability to exercise their own powers and perform their own functions. The 
contradictory, overlapping and parallel support and enforcement measures by 
national government go beyond the permissible limits of regulation in s 155(7) 
of the Constitution. In the words of the Habitat Council Court, they impermissibly 
intrude on the autonomous sphere of authority accorded to municipalities by 
the Constitution.117 From the local government perspective, the combined 
effect of these attempts constitutes the usurpation of local government’s power. 
Municipalities find themselves hamstrung by national regulation. This is not the 
broad managing and controlling envisaged by s 155(7) of the Constitution.
As highlighted by De Visser and Steytler, in the context of municipal powers 
relating to land use planning, the courts have been eager to jealously guard 
this newly found autonomy of the local sphere. In this context, there are just 
too many peremptory norms which, if not complied with, and if courts were 
113 Constitution s 160 provides that a Municipal Council makes decisions concerning the exercise of 
all the powers and the performance of all the functions of the municipality.
114 Constitution s 151(4).
115 Performance Regulations of 2006 from then DPLG; Competency Regulations of 2007 from 
Treasury; Appointment Regulations of 2014 from CoGTA; Disciplinary Regulations of 2011 from 
CoGTA; and Financial Misconduct Regulations of 2014 from Treasury. There are also mooted 
regulations from DPSA.
116 Habitat Council (note 42 above) at para 22.
117 See also Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning of the Western 
Cape v Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd & others [2013] ZACC 39, 2014 (1) SA 521 (CC), 2014 (2) BCLR 
182 (CC) at para 46.
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to follow the approach of the minority judgment in Liebenberg,118 could render 
local administrative decisions vulnerable to procedural challenges with grave 
consequences for municipal autonomy. Will the courts hold that human resource 
decisions (appointments, suspensions, dismissals) are invalid purely because one 
of the ‘musts’ in the increasingly confusing set of laws has not been complied 
with?
Take, for example, the following scenario as presented by De Visser elsewhere:
The Municipal Manager of a small rural municipality needs to address the problem of a 
manager who is not performing, is possibly incompetent and is accused of mismanaging 
municipal funds. How many different laws must she consult to address this situation 
effectively and in accordance with the rule of law? On the issue of competency and 
performance, there are three laws…. The Municipal Manager may therefore have to consult 
at least six laws to deal with her problem, excluding internal council protocols and policies. 
Her efforts to deal with a real problem in line with the rule of law are thus complicated by 
two Departments seemingly competing for space to regulate local government.119
The correct approach to follow is the generous approach adopted by the majority 
of the Court in Liebenberg where it found that an administrative hiccup should 
not necessarily invalidate the actions of the Municipal Manager in question. The 
following dictum should find particular resonance:
[A] failure by a municipality to comply with relevant statutory provisions does not 
necessarily lead to the actions under scrutiny being rendered invalid. The question is 
whether there has been substantial compliance, taking into account the relevant statutory 
provisions in particular and the legislative scheme as a whole.120
The current scenario may encourage the courts to rewrite the statute book and 
thus assert the independence of local authority that is being eroded by warring 
departments. 
E Duplication and Overlapping Resulting in Overregulation
The outpouring of laws also causes duplication and overlap. There is a barrage of 
similar laws regulating the same or similar subject matter. In this section, I dissect 
the provisions emanating from different statutes and regulations regulating 
compulsory education requirements and ethics.
1 Compulsory Education Requirements
aa Municipal Systems Act and Appointment Regulations
Compulsory educational requirements for employment are already dealt with 
sufficiently by CoGTA through the Municipal Systems Act (as Amended) and 
the Appointment Regulations. Section 54A(3) read with s 56(2) of the Municipal 
Systems Act provides that the appointment of a municipal manager or a manager 
118 Liebenberg NO and Others v Bergrivier Municipality [2013] ZACC 16, 2013 (5) SA 246 (CC), 2013 (8) 
BCLR 863 (CC)(‘Liebenberg’).
119 J De Visser ‘Editorial’ (2012) 14(3) Local Government Bulletin.
120 Liebenberg (note 116 above) at para 26.
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reporting directly to the municipal manager is null and void if the person does not 
have the prescribed skills, expertise, competencies or qualification. Reg 8(1)(b) of 
the Appointment Regulations, in turn, provides that no person may be appointed 
as a senior manager unless he or she possesses the relevant competencies, 
qualifications, experience, and knowledge set out in Annexures A and B to these 
regulations.121
bb Competency Regulations
On the other hand, the National Treasury also deals thoroughly with compulsory 
education requirements through the Competency Regulations. Regulations 3, 5, 
7, 9, 11 and 12 of the Competency Regulations contain a comprehensive list of 
compulsory education requirements for financial and supply chain management 
officers. As noted earlier the Competency Regulations create detailed requirements 
for appointment, depending on the budget size of a municipality. A financial 
officer is defined as any official exercising ‘financial management responsibilities’, 
including the accounting officer, the chief financial officer, a senior manager 
or any other financial official.122 Given the breadth of the definition, these 
regulations appear to apply to all senior managers including, for example, human 
resource managers who manage huge budgets and therefore exercise financial 
management responsibilities.
The Appointment Regulations and the Competency Regulations contradict 
each other. One example is the compulsory requirement under the Competency 
Regulations for a certificate in municipal financial management discussed earlier. 
The Appointment Regulations, in turn, say that a certificate of competency in a 
particular field is not a requirement but an added advantage. Municipalities could 
easily choose the less stringent of the two regulations and render the Competency 
Regulations redundant.
cc Public Administration Management Act
PAMA contains provisions relating to compulsory educational requirements for 
employment in public administration which includes local government. Section 
13(1) of PAMA provides that:
[t]he Minister [of DPSA] may, after approval by the Cabinet, direct that the successful 
completion of specified education, training, examinations or tests is—
(a)   a prerequisite for specified appointments or transfers; and
(b)  compulsory in order to meet development needs of any category of employees.
Subsection (2) provides that, in the case of a directive to be applicable to local 
government, the Minister of DPSA must consult organised local government and 
obtain the concurrence of the Minister of CoGTA before seeking the approval 
of the Cabinet contemplated in subsection (1). This means that there are more 
compulsory education requirements in the offing for local government. If it acts 
121 Annexure B requires a Bachelor degree in public administration/political science/law or 
equivalent; five years of experience at senior management level; and knowledge in relevant fields for 
a municipal manager.
122 Competency Regulations reg 1. 
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under PAMA, DPSA will be adding nothing new except adding an additional 
layer of ‘musts’ to the already strangulated sector. The existing frameworks already 
contradict each other and leave room for cherry-picking; a third competency 
framework from DPSA will add an additional, unnecessary layer of compliance.
2 Ethics
aa PAMA 
On the ethical side, PAMA prohibits employees from conducting business with 
the state and instructs employees to disclose their financial interests. Failure to 
do so constitutes misconduct.123 At a local level, this is dealt with sufficiently 
in item 5A of the Code of Conduct for Municipal Staff Members contained in 
schedule 2 to the Municipal Systems Act. This constitutes duplication and an 
additional ‘trip wire’. Section 4(1)(b) of the Code of Conduct for Municipal Staff 
Members also prohibits a staff member of a municipality from taking a decision 
on behalf of a municipality in which that staff member or his spouse, partner or 
business associate, has a direct or indirect personal or private business interest. 
Section 4(3) further provides that no staff member of a municipality may be 
a party to or benefit from a contract for the provision of goods or services to 
any municipality or any municipal entity established by a municipality.124 As 
can be seen, PAMA and the Code of Conduct for Municipal Staff Members are 
pure duplication. Requiring municipalities to comply with different provisions 
emanating from different sources but addressing the same issues, constitutes 
adverse overregulation which potentially violates the rule of law.
bb Financial Misconduct Regulations vis-à-vis Codes of Conduct
The Financial Misconduct Regulations,125 published in terms of the MFMA by 
the National Treasury in 2014, seek to regulate the processes and procedures 
to be followed by municipalities when dealing with the (alleged) commission 
of financial misconduct. They apply to all officials and political office bearers 
within municipalities and municipal entities.
First, a question that needs to be answered honestly relates to how an official 
(and a political office bearer) could commit financial misconduct without falling 
foul of the Codes of Conduct for Councillors and Municipal Staff Members? The 
introduction of the Financial Misconduct Regulations presupposes that one can 
commit an act of financial misconduct and not fall foul of the Code of Conduct. 
The Codes of Conduct comprehensively cover instances of financial misconduct. 
If by committing an act of financial misconduct a councillor or municipal staff 
member is also committing a breach of the Code of Conduct for Councillors or 
for Municipal Staff Members, as the case may be, then there was no need for the 
enactment of these Regulations. All that was required was the beefing up of the 
123 PAMA s 8.
124 Item 6 of the Code of Conduct for Councillors, schedule 1 of the Municipal Systems Act, 
contains similar provisions in relation to councillors. 
125 Municipal Regulations on Financial Misconduct Procedures and Criminal Proceedings, 
Government Gazette 37699, General Notice R430 (30 May 2014).
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Codes of Conduct. Their existence only serves as a source of duplication, causes 
legal uncertainty on which laws to apply and may result in the erosion of the rule 
of law.
Second, reg 3(1)(a) of the Financial Misconduct Regulations provides that ‘any 
allegation of financial misconduct against the accounting officer, a senior manager 
or the chief financial officer of a municipality, must be reported to the municipal 
council of the municipality, the provincial treasury and the national treasury.’ 
This is in direct conflict with item 13 of the Code of Conduct for Municipal 
Staff Members which requires that a breach of the Code should be reported 
to a superior officer or the speaker of the council, not the other functionaries 
mentioned in reg 3(1)(a). This confusion will result in yet another instance of 
cherry-picking the laws that suit the one reporting the alleged breach. Again, this 
results in legal uncertainty which ultimately undermines the principle of legality 
and consequently the rule of law.
Furthermore, certain provisions of the Financial Misconduct Regulations seem 
to go beyond the term ‘regulating’ and may be unconstitutional. First, reg 19 
provides for intervention by the National and Provincial Treasuries in the event 
that the municipal council does not take the recommendations of the Disciplinary 
Board126 seriously. If that happens, the National and Provincial treasuries may 
direct the council to take the recommended steps. This goes beyond regulation, 
which was said to be limited to the determination of ‘norms and guidelines’ in 
Habitat Council.127 It constitutes a direct authorisation function.
In Habitat Council, the Constitutional Court had to decide the contours of the 
constitutional duty of oversight bestowed on provincial government by s 155(7) of 
the Constitution. In the context of the concurrent planning functions, the Court 
held that the province’s exercise of appellate powers over municipalities’ exercise 
of their planning functions constituted an impermissible usurpation of the power 
of local authorities to manage municipal planning.128 The Court went on to say 
that the provincial appellate capability intrudes into the autonomous sphere of 
authority the Constitution accords to municipalities, and fails to recognise the 
distinctiveness of the municipal sphere.129 It follows that the power to direct 
councils to do certain things, as reg 19 of the Financial Misconduct Regulations 
suggests, amounts to an impermissible usurpation of powers conferred on the 
local sphere of government. It ‘encroaches on the geographical, functional or 
institutional integrity of local government’130 in the same way that the appellate 
powers of the province were found to intrude on the autonomous sphere of 
authority accorded to municipalities.
Second, it is not clear what reg 19 actually means by ‘may direct’. What is it that 
a Provincial Treasury or the National Treasury may direct? Does it mean that 
they may direct the municipality to investigate the allegation or that they may 
126 A board established in terms of reg 4 to investigate allegations of financial misconduct and to 
monitor the institution of disciplinary proceedings against an alleged transgressor.
127 Habitat Council (note 42 above).
128 Ibid at para 13, see also para 22.
129 Ibid at para 13.
130 Constitution s 41(1)(g).
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do the investigation themselves by designating a person or persons in line with 
s 106 of the Municipal Systems Act and item 14(4) of the Code of Conduct for 
Councillors? If ‘may direct’ means the latter, then this provision is a duplication of 
the existing law. In any event, the lack of clarity on the purpose of this provision 
leads to legal uncertainty and thus the violation of the essential requirement of 
the rule of law that laws must be clear in meaning.
cc Disciplinary Regulations 
CoGTA issued the Disciplinary Regulations131 in 2011, which deal with all forms 
of misconduct committed by senior managers. Insofar as the senior managers are 
concerned they, once again, replicate the Financial Misconduct Regulations, the 
Disciplinary Regulations and the Codes of Conduct for Councillors and Municipal 
Staff Members. This adds not only to overregulation, but to the perceived 
competition between CoGTA and the National Treasury which suffocates 
the local sphere of government.132 The regulations or guidelines envisaged by 
PAMA to regulate conduct and levels of ethics expected of public administration 
officials will add DPSA as the third point of a triangle of competition over local 
government.
v  the caSe for a SIngLe Set of reguLatIonS and Improved 
coordInatIon
The effect of the multitude of regulations I have discussed is this: At least in the 
arena of personnel regulation, local government has been reduced to an agent 
that merely complies with the demands of other spheres of government instead of 
expending its resources and energy on delivering much needed services to local 
residents. This manifestly ‘intrudes on the autonomous sphere of authority the 
Constitution accords to municipalities’.133 And it undermines the rule of law by 
creating an impenetrable and contradictory set of regulations that often incentivise 
conduct that is contrary to the purpose the regulations sought to achieve.
For the sake of legal certainty, I suggest that CoGTA and the National Treasury 
should synchronise efforts and come up with a single, comprehensive set of 
regulations to replace the overregulation, duplication and overlaps that currently 
infect local government. The blueprint for this system already exist – the proposals 
131 Local Government: Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers, General Notice 344, 
Government Gazette 34213, General Notice 344 (21 April 2011).
132 SALGA ‘Presentation at the 8th National Municipal Managers Forum’ (2014), available at 
http://www.salga.org.za/app/webroot/assets/files/MediaRoomStatements/8th%20National%20
Municipal%20Managers%20Forum/1_%20%20SALGA%20CEO%20Presentation.pdf (Suggests 
that the turf battles and competition between National Treasury, CoGTA and now DPSA are caused 
by poorly defined roles and responsibilities between national departments. They further suggest 
that the on-going turf battles between these departments distract from the task of capacitating local 
government.)
133 Habitat Council (note 42 above) at para 13.
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contained in the Draft Green Paper on Cooperative Governance.134 The first 
of these proposals relates to the development of a single integrated system of 
administering municipal legislation based on standardised regulations, guidelines 
and circulars similar to the system employed by the National Treasury.135 The 
second relevant proposal is to establish a ‘Standing Interdepartmental Committee 
of the Department of Cooperative Governance, National Treasury and the 
Department of Public Service and Administration’.136 This committee should 
enable the sharing of knowledge and information to ensure that the respective 
laws, guidelines and regulations emanating from these departments, especially as 
they relate to local government, are consistent and coherent.137 This committee 
should be established by a Cabinet decision and should report to Cabinet, in order 
to enforce its formal nature.
The need for this committee, which will enforce cooperation at a horizontal 
level, is occasioned by the fact that the Intergovernmental Relations Framework 
Act138 defines intergovernmental relations and institutional arrangements within 
government with a focus on the vertical relations between the three spheres.139 
There is an inadequate focus on the horizontal relations between government 
departments addressing the same issue (local government) within the same sphere 
(national). That is the biggest contributor to the overregulation, duplication and 
turf battles decried in this paper. This absence of a horizontal mechanism to 
regulate inter-departmental relations is proving to be the most difficult challenge 
in improving capacity and, as a corollary, service delivery in the majority of 
municipalities.140
A further suggestion relates to the establishment of a special Cabinet Committee 
on provincial and local government whose aim will be to discuss and scrutinise 
all policy and legislation impacting on sub-national government before they go to 
Cabinet for decision.141
There are many other laudable policy proposals contained in the Draft 
Green Paper. Government should be encouraged to hasten the development 
of some of these structures, especially those that seek to facilitate horizontal 
intergovernmental coordination, as they promise to deal with the perceived 
competition and turf battles between national departments. These bodies could 
134 Department of Cooperative Governance ‘Draft Green Paper on Cooperative Governance’ 
(2011) 32 (‘Draft Green Paper’).
135 Ibid at 64. See generally SJ Greÿling The South African Local Government National Capacity 
Building Framework of 2011: Critical Future Considerations for 2016 (2015) PhD dissertation, University of 
Johannesburg.
136 Draft Green Paper (note 132 above) at 32. See generally LP Malan ‘Intergovernmental Relations 
in South Africa: A Revised Policy Approach to Co-operative Government. (2012) 5(2) African Journal 
of Public Affairs 115.
137 Malan (note 134 above) at 122. 
138 Act 13 of 2005.
139 Draft Green Paper (note 132 above) at item 5.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid at 32.
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go a long way to aligning the existing laws into a single coherent policy. They 
would ensure that future policy initiatives are coherent. In addition, by eliminating 
competition for control over local government, they would hopefully ensure that 
national and provincial laws do not intrude impermissibly on the autonomous 
sphere of authority accorded to municipalities.
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